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PEOPLEv. EICHELBERGER:*
POLICE-CREATED PROBABLE CAUSE
AS AN EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE
The United States Supreme Court has proscribed warrantless nonconsensual arrest in a suspect's home absent exigent
circumstances.' In People v. Eichelberger,2 the Illinois Supreme
Court considered whether the warrantless arrest of the defendant in his hotel room fell under the exigency exception because
the offense was committed in the arresting officer's presence.
The Eichelbergercourt liberally construed the exigency requirement by equating probable cause3 with exigency, 4 and held the
5
arrest valid.
An informant, Michael Flavin, told Paxton, Illinois police officers that James Eichelberger was selling drugs from his room
in a local hotel.6 The officers decided to investigate, and Flavin
* 91 Ill.
2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140, cert. denied,

-

U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 383

(1982).
1. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
2. 91 Ill. 2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140 (1982).
3. Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense was or is being committed. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 358 Mass. 747, 267 N.E.2d 213
(1971). Illinois courts have consistently stated that, for purposes of arrest,
"probable cause" and "reasonable grounds" are synonymous. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 98 Ill. App. 3d 461, 464, 424 N.E.2d 630, 634 (1981); People v.
Walls, 87 Ill.
App. 3d 256, 262-63, 408 N.E.2d 1056, 1062 (1980); People v. Nolan,
59 Ill. App. 3d 177, 185, 375 N.E.2d 445, 452 (1978); People v. Denwiddie, 50 Ill.
App. 3d 184, 189, 365 N.E.2d 978, 982 (1977).
4. Exigency has been broadly defined as an "emergency or dangerous
situation." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980). Accord Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) ("hot pursuit" of a suspect); State v. Anonymous, 34 Conn. Supp. 531, 375 A.2d 417 (1977) (officers must act quickly to
prevent a suspect from fleeing); State v. Lloyd, 61 Hawaii 505, 606 P.2d 913
(1980) (authorities trying to capture a suspect who is armed or dangerous);
State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978) (compelling need for immediate police response); State v. Trujillo, 95 N.M. 535, 624 P.2d 44 (1981) (need
to act in order to prevent the destruction of evidence).
5. People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill.
2d 359, 370-71,438 N.E.2d 140, 145 (1982).
6. A warrant may be issued on the basis of a tip given by an informant
if there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the informant's source of
knowledge is reliable and that the informant himself is telling the truth.
People v. Smith, 101 Ill.
App. 3d 772, 775, 428 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1981). At trial,
Eichelberger argued that the police should have obtained a warrant before
arresting him because they had information about Eichelberger's suspected
illegal activities more than 24 hours prior to the arrest. The trial court dismissed this argument, stating that it was "obvious" that there were no
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agreed to assist them by staging a "controlled buy."'7 At a prearranged time, the police were to listen at the wall to Eichelberger's room 8 while Flavin led him into the sale.

The

investigation proceeded as planned, except that the officers' observation was facilitated because Eichelberger had left the door
to his room slightly ajar.9 When the conversation between Eichelberger and Flavin led the officers to believe that the sale was
occurring, they entered the room and placed Eichelberger under
arrest. 10 The trial court denied Eichelberger's motion to supgrounds to obtain a warrant prior to the arrest. This unexplained conclusion was not an issue on appeal. People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 364,
438 N.E.2d 140, 142 (1982).
7. Narcotics cases present peculiar problems for law enforcement
agents. Drug-law violations usually involve secret transactions with willing
participants, making detection difficult unless agents induce a sale. A tip
from an informer may furnish the requisite probable cause upon which a
warrant will be granted, but in most cases, if the officers then make a
search, they will only be able to charge the defendant with possession; they
will not be able to charge him with an illegal sale.
Staging a "controlled buy" is a common and generally accepted practice
in this area. Although this type of police activity may raise the question of
entrapment, the courts have generally upheld its validity. To successfully
plead entrapment, the defendant must show that the intent to commit the
crime originated with the officers and that, in the absence of this inducement, the crime would not have occurred. See United States v. Russel, 411
U.S. 423, 432 (1973). See generally H. LEVINE, LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF DRUG
ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES Ch. VI (1974) (enforcement of drug laws is
complicated by invocation of the exclusionary rule after a defendant successfully pleads entrapment); Note, Entrapment, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1333
(1960); Annot., 62 A.L.R. 3d 110 (1975).
8. The Paxton police officers had the hotel owner's permission to use
the room adjacent to the defendant's for surveillance purposes. Petition for
Leave to Appeal at 6, People v. Eichelberger, 91 Mll. 2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140
(1982).
9. There was conflicting testimony as to how far the door had been left
open. Compare Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 5, 13, People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140 (1982) ("door was only cracked open")
with Petition for Leave to Appeal at 7, People v. Eichelbrger, 91 Ill. 2d 359,
438 N.E.2d 140 (1982) (one officer visually observed the sale through the
opening). In view of the court's finding, a resolution of this issue was unnecessary. See infra text accompanying notes 15-23.
10. The arresting officer testified that he overheard conversation about
"grams" and "coke" which he knew from experience to be references to
opium and cocaine, respectively. People v. Eichelberger, 91 111. 2d 359, 36364, 438 N.E.2d 140, 142 (1982). The particular experience of an officer is admissible to show that probable cause had been established. United States
v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975) (experienced border agent detected smuggling); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (officers on narcotics
duty familiar with the odor of burning opium); People v. Handy, 44 Ill. App.
3d 835, 838, 358 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (1976) (officer's experience in gambling unit
led him to believe that suspect's collection of envelopes was part of a policy
operation). "What constitutes 'probable cause' for searches and seizures
must be determined from the standpoint of the officer, with his skills and
knowledge, rather than from the standpoint of an average citizen under
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press evidence obtained during the arrest" and convicted him
of possession of a controlled substance. 12 The Illinois Appellate
Court reversed and remanded, holding that the evidence should
have been suppressed because it had been confiscated during a
warrantless arrest which was not justified by exigent
13
circumstances.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
14
Ryan, reversed the appellate court and held the arrest valid.
The court determined as a preliminary matter that Eichelberger
had not waived his fourth amendment rights' 5 by his status as a
similar circumstances." People v. Symmonds, 18 Ill. App. 3d 587, 597, 310
N.E.2d 208, 215 (1974).
The officers in Eichelberger did not "knock and announce" their purpose as is generally required in search and seizure cases. People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140 (1982). See Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 308 (1958) (knock-and-announce rule applies to search and seizure
cases). But see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (exception to requirement of compliance with the "knock and announce" rule). Although a
"knock and announce" issue seems to be presented by the facts of Eichelberger, it was not discussed by the courts which ruled upon the case. For a
discussion of the rule and its constitutional implications, see Blakey, The
Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and
Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1964).
11. The exclusionary rule was formulated as a remedy for violation of
the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Under the exclusionary rule, evidence confiscated during an unreasonable search or seizure
may not be introduced at trial as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief. See
Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621. Eichelberger argued that the contraband brought forward at his trial should have been suppressed because it
had been obtained pursuant to a warrantless arrest allegedly violative of his
fourth amendment rights. Brief for Appellee at 4, People v. Eichelberger, 91
Ill. 2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140 (1982).
12. Defendant was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56%, § 1402(b) (1979). 91 M11.
2d 359, 362, 438 N.E.2d
140, 141.
13. People v. Eichelberger, 92 Ill. App. 3d 1199, 423 N.E.2d 995 (1981).
The disposition of the case was ordered under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
23, which allows appellate courts to summarily rule on cases which have
little precedential value. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 23 (1979). The appellate
court opinion is not published, but is reproduced in the appendix to the
Petition for Leave to Appeal, People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 438 N.E.2d
140 (1982).
14. 91 Ill. 2d at 362, 438 N.E.2d at 141.
15. Generally, one may waive any constitutional privilege or right as
long as it inheres to the individual and is intended for his sole benefit, but
the waiver must be voluntary. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35
(1964) (examples of permissible waiver of constitutional right). However,
"'the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)). See also People v. Saponara, 94 Misc. 2d 936, 937, 405 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896 (1978); 15 AM. JuR.
2D ConstitutionalLaw § 205 (1979).
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hotel guest or by reason of the open door. 16 The court stated
that, as a matter of Illinois law, an occupant of a hotel room is
entitled to the same expectation of privacy and concomitant
17
fourth amendment protection as a resident in a private home.
His expectation may be diminished, however, due to the nature
of multiple occupancy dwellings.' 8 Because common areas of
the building may be accessible to the public, a resident cannot
expect his right of privacy to include what may be perceived
from those areas.' 9 The court held that although Eichelberger's
fourth amendment expectation of privacy was reduced because
he was residing in a hotel and his door was ajar, it was not
waived. 20 The court found that Eichelberger was also protected
from warrantless entries to arrest unless the circumstances
16. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), involving an allegedly
unconstitutional search by governmental eavesdropping, it was held that it
is the expectation of privacy, and not the place, which is determinative in
search and seizure cases. Id. at 353. Whether one may claim fourth amendment protection depends on whether he exhibits an expectation of privacy
and whether that expectation is one which society will recognize as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In Eichelberger,the state appealed

the court's ruling that Eichelberger maintained a reasonable and recognizable expectation of privacy, contending that he had "converted his room into
a commercial center to which outsiders were implicitly invited to view him
and others transacting unlawful business." Petition for Leave to Appeal, at
17, People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140 (1982). The prosecution argued that Eichelberger had thereby "dispensed" with his expectation
of privacy and so lost his fourth-amendment Payton protection. Id. at 20.
17. 91 IlI. 2d at 364-65, 438 N.E.2d at 142. See also People v. Bankhead, 27
Ill. 2d 18, 187 N.E.2d 705 (1963).
18. See, e.g., People v. Blount, 101 Ill. App. 3d 443, 428 N.E.2d 621 (1981)
(guest in hotel corridor is not protected as he would be in a private dwelling). See also W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3, at 306-13 (1978).
19. See People v. Wright, 41 Ill. 2d 170, 242 N.E.2d 180 (1968) (police
standing on C.T.A. right-of-way saw defendant gambling in his house) cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969). Accord Commonwealth v. Busfield, 242 Pa.
Super. 194, 363 A.2d 1227 (1976) (officer obtained neighbor's permission to
use his window to look into defendant's home). But cf. Pate v. Municipal
Court, 11 Cal. App. 3d 721, 89 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1970) (violation of fourth
amendment when police positioned themselves where neighbors or the
general public would not ordinarily be); Cohen v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.
App. 3d 429, 85 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1970) (remanding the case, the court indicated
that the search would be unconstitutional where police observed suspect's
activities from fire escape, which was not used unless there was an
emergency).
20. People v. Eichelberger, 91 IlM. 2d 359,365-66, 438 N.E.2d 140, 143 (1982).
Eichelberger may not have reasonably maintained an expectation to be free
from observation, but he retained a right to be free from entry and arrest.
The court stated that "[w]hile defendant's 'cracked open' hotel room door
may have facilitated the overhearing of activities carried on within the room
by those outside, that fact by itself was in no way an invitation to or a justification for a warrantless entry." Id. at 366, 438 N.E.2d at 143. The court distinguished People v. Wright, 41 Ill. 2d 170, 242 N.E.2d 180 (1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 933 (1969), and other cases which the state cited in its brief because
they dealt with objections to observation-not warrantless entry. The court
noted that observation is a lesser intrusion upon one's privacy interest than
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were exigent. 21 The court concluded that the exigency require22
ment was fulfilled because the officers witnessed the offense
23
action.
police
a circumstance which demanded prompt
Because the court found that Eichelberger had not forfeited
his fourth amendment rights, the key issue was whether the
warrantless entry and arrest were constitutional. 24 Payton v.
New York, 25 a United States Supreme Court decision which
dealt with the permissibility of warrantless home arrests, was
recognized as controlling. 26 In Payton, the Court held that the
fourth amendment to the Constitution prohibits warrantless
nonconsensual 27 entry into a suspect's home to make a routine
felony arrest absent exigent circumstances. 28 The Court, however, did not define what circumstances might be exigent, 29 leaving that determination to the lower courts.
physical entry, and therefore objections to an observation are more easily
dismissed. 91 Ill. 2d at 365-66, 438 N.E.2d at 143.
21. Id. at 366, 438 N.E.2d at 143.
22. Before the Payton decision, Illinois law allowed warrantless entries
and arrests upon a showing of probable cause in controlled-buy narcotics
cases. See, e.g., People v. Marquis, 24 Ill. App. 3d 653, 321 N.E.2d 480 (1974)
(after sale, undercover agent followed defendant into his residence); People
v. Keelen, 130 IlM. App. 2d 52, 264 N.E.2d 753 (1970) (after receiving evidence
from informant, police arrested defendant in his girlfriend's apartment);
People v. Scott, 110 Ill. App. 2d 368, 249 N.E.2d 220 (1969) (officers entered
and arrested defendant after informant had obtained heroin from him). Eichelberger was the first post-Payton case to rule upon the issue of whether
a warrantless home arrest is permissible in controlled-buy cases. The court
held that Eichelberger's arrest was valid, thereby indicating that warrantless home arrests would be upheld in spite of the exigency requirement set
out in Payton. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65.
23. 91 Ill. 2d at 369, 438 N.E.2d at 145.
24. Id. at 365-66, 438 N.E.2d at 143.
25. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
26. 91 Ill. 2d at 366, 438 N.E.2d at 143. Before Payton, it was unclear
whether an officer could make a warrantless home arrest on probable cause
alone. The states were divided on the issue, with growing numbers of them
requiring exigent circumstances in addition to probable cause. Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 575 nn.2-4, 598-99 nn.46-48 (1980).
27. The vast majority of cases hold the warrant requirement inapposite
in consent contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)
(consent may be given not only by the party to be arrested, but also by a
third party of sufficient relationship); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 487 (1971) (dicta suggesting that evidence would clearly be admissible
if obtained pursuant to owner's consent). See also Gardener, Consent as a
Bar to Fourth Amendment Scope-A Critique of a Common Theory, 71 J.

CRIM. L. 443 (1980).
28. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
29. Id. at 583. Payton was a consolidation of two New York cases
presenting similar questions of law. In both cases, the prosecution relied
solely on the officers' statutory authority to make the arrests and therefore
did not try to justify the arrests as being made under exigent circumstances. Thus, what might be viewed as exigent and sufficient to justify a
warrantless home arrest was not a question before the Court.
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In People v. Abney, 30 the Illinois Supreme Court set forth
several factors to be considered in determining whether exigent
circumstances exist.3 1 These factors include whether prompt

action was necessary, 32 whether there was any delay during
which a warrant might have been obtained,33 whether the crime
was violent, 34 whether the arrest was made peaceably,3 5 and
whether there was a clear showing of probable cause. 36 The Eichelberger court discussed the factors enumerated in Abney,
but did not expressly apply them. Instead, the majority opinion
distinguished the facts of the Eichelberger case from those in
Payton and Abney; 37 in Eichelberger,the offense was committed in the presence of the officers,38 while in both Payton and
Abney the crime had been committed prior to the time of arrest.3

9

The court based its opinion on this distinction.

30. 81 Ill. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543 (1980).
31. Id. at 169-73, 407 N.E.2d at 547-49. These guidelines appear to be derived from the leading pre-Payton case, Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d
385 (D.C. Cir. 1970), which required exigency in addition to probable cause
to justify a warrantless home arrest.
32. Situations requiring a prompt police response include "hot pursuit"
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (officials
entered defendant's home when they saw her run back inside); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1966) (police entered residence a few minutes after
receiving information that a suspected armed robber had just entered).
33. Cf Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 394-95 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(lengthy discussion of the fact that officers had tried unsuccessfully to obtain a warrant, supporting the position that the warrantless arrest was
reasonable).
34. A situation involving an armed or violent felon is regarded as a grave
threat to the community. In such cases, a court may dispense with the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1966) (armed
robbery); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (violent
robbery). Cf Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (no
need to proceed without a warrant where a gambling offense is involved).
35. Although forcible entry may be justified under some circumstances,
see, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963), it is generally evidence of
the unreasonableness of the warrantless arrest. State v. McNeal, 251 S.E.2d
484, 488-89 (W.Va. 1979) (arrest unreasonable where police kicked the door
down).
36. A clear showing of probable cause would include strong reason to
believe that the suspect is on the premises and justification for the belief
that the suspect is actually the criminal sought. People v. Abney, 81 IIl. 3d
159, 171-72, 407 N.E.2d 543, 549 (1980). See generally Donnino &Gierese, Exigent Circumstancesfor a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 ALB. L. REV. 90
(1980).
37. See infra text accompanying note 62.
38. The officers "observed" the offense by hearing the alleged drug sale
in progress. 91 M. 2d at 368-69, 438 N.E.2d at 144-45.
39. In Abney, police went to defendant's residence after filling out a report and interviewing the victim at the hospital. People v. Abney, 81 111. 2d
159, 162, 407 N.E.2d 543, 544 (1980). Payton was a consolidation of two appeals. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In one case, Payton's home
was entered without a warrant two days after the occurrence of a homicide
in which he was a suspect. Id. at 576-77. In Riddick v. New York, the com-
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The Eichelbergercourt noted that, in Illinois, an officer is authorized to make a warrantless arrest when he reasonably believes that a crime is being committed in his presence. 4° It is not
necessary that the belief be the result of direct visual observation; it may be based on evidence perceived by any of the
senses. 4 1 The court concluded that "[t]he fact that the officers
reasonably believed that a felony was being committed in their
presence demanded prompt police action and constituted an exigent circumstance which justified the warrantless entry into
the hotel room and the arrest."42 The court went on to state that
each case must be decided on its own facts, using a reasonableness standard, 43 but that an arrest made while a crime is being
committed in the officers' presence conforms to the fourth
amendment standard of reasonableness, and is, therefore,
constitutional."
Eichelbergerwas a four-to-three decision. The dissenters, in
an opinion written by Justice Clark, objected to the majority's
conclusion 45 that the mere observation of the narcotics sale
alone was a factor which created sufficient exigency to justify a
warrantless home arrest.4 The dissent noted that the Court in
Payton was "unequivocal in asserting that reasonable belief or
47
probable cause is not enough to justify a warrantless entry,"
yet the majority found that the reasonable belief of the Paxton
pardon case, the defendant was arrested three years after the armed robbery he allegedly committed. Id. at 578-79.
40. People v. Eichelberger, 91 IlM. 2d 359,438 N.E.2d 140 (1982). Such conduct is authorized by statute in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2(c)
(1979). Accord People v. Phillips, 30 IlM. 2d 158, 160, 195 N.E.2d 717, 718-19
(1964) (warrantless arrest upheld where officers observed needle and syringe in the house when defendant opened the door); People v. Peak, 29 Ill.
2d 343, 347, 194 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1963) (arrest valid when officers saw defendant pick up a packet which they were told contained illegal narcotics).
41. See People v. Bradley, 152 Cal. App. 2d 527, 532-33, 314 P.2d 108, 111
(1957); Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 599, 16 A.2d 642, 647 (1940), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 695 (1940); Mathews v. State, 67 Okla. Crim. 203, 211, 93 P.2d 549, 553
(1939). See also 5 Am. Ju. 2D Arrests § 31, at 721-22 (1962) (collection of
cases from various jurisdictions stating that evidence perceived by any of
the five senses may be sufficient to supply the requisite probable cause).
42. People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 369, 438 N.E.2d 140, 145 (1982).
43. Id. at 371, 438 N.E.2d at 145.
44. Id. at 370, 438 N.E.2d at 145.
45. The dissent agreed with the majority that the defendant had retained a reasonable expectation of privacy even though he was a hotel guest
and had his door "cracked open," and that Payton was controlling. Id. at
371-72, 438 N.E.2d at 145-46 (Clark, J., dissenting).
46. The dissent reasoned that "law enforcement officials cannot set up a
controlled buy of drugs and then attempt to justify an unannounced warrantless entry into a private hotel room by asserting that because the drug
sale was in their presence it constituted an exigent circumstance." Id. at
374, 438 N.E.2d at 147 (Clark, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 373, 438 N.E.2d at 146 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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officers created exigent circumstances in and of itself. The dissent rejected that conclusion as inconsistent with the Payton
decision.4 8
Analysis of Eichelberger indicates that the majority employed circular reasoning in reaching its conclusion. The court
was correct in its initial determination that Eichelberger had a
reasonable expectation of privacy 4 9 and that Payton was controlling.50 Payton evinced a pervasive concern with protecting
an individual's right to privacy. The Court stated that "[t]he
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the [f]ourth [a]mendment is directed."'5 1 The warrant clause was inserted in the Constitution to protect the sanctity of the home. 52 The requirement that a warrant be issued by
an objective magistrate before a home arrest insures that one's
fourth amendment rights will not be abridged at the discretion
of police officers.5 3 The clause aims to balance the competing
interests of the individual in being free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and that of society in being free from
54

criminal activity.

48. "[T]he majority misses the point of Payton in allowing the extent of

fourth amendment protections to turn on the reasonable beliefs of law enforcement officials." Id. at 374, 438 N.E.2d at 147 (Clark, J., dissenting).
49. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
50. People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill.
2d 359, 366, 438 N.E.2d 140, 143 (1982).
51. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980) (warrantless home
arrests are presumptively unreasonable). Accord Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) ("a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable").
52. See generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FouRTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUION 13-78 (1937).

53. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
54. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the
need to weigh the valid interest of society in being free from criminal activity with an individual's interest in privacy and freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Court has, however, recognized the individual's
interest as overriding in most cases. See, e.g., United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1972). In a case involving domestic security surveillance, the Court's task was "to examine and balance the basic
values at stake...: the duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy .... " Id. at 314-15. See also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,

313 (1958) (although unauthorized police action may be directed at achieving law and order, if traditional procedural requirements are not complied
with, such action is unconstitutional); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14-15 (1948) (in rare instances "on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy," the warrant requirement may be
disregarded). In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), the Court upheld warrantless public arrest as constitutional on the grounds that such
practice was accepted at common law and that there was evidence of a congressional determination that these arrests were valid. Inherent in the Watson Court's reasoning was the determination that although the suspect's
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The Supreme Court recognized that under certain circumstances it might be impracticable to obtain a warrant. 55 This is
the exception to the rule, however, and Payton sought to limit
its impact by requiring "exigent circumstances" before dispensing with the warrant requirement. Although Payton never addressed the issue of what circumstances are exigent, 56 it did
equate the word exigency with an "emergency or dangerous situation.15 7 The individual states were left the task of filling in the
particulars encompassed by this broad definition.
In People v. Abney, 58 the Illinois Supreme Court harmonized the Payton decision with existing state law. The constitutionality of the Illinois statute conferring power upon police
officers to make warrantless home arrests, without expressly requiring exigent circumstances, became questionable as a result
of Payton.59 The A bney court upheld the law as constitutional,
reasoning that the exigency requirement had been "judicially
engrafted" upon the statute. 60 By its own detailed analysis of
the Abney case and enumeration of relevant factors, 61 the Abrights may be somewhat impaired by the warrantless public arrest, that impairment is outweighed by the strong interest of the state in effective apprehension of criminals. Id. at 431 (Powell, J., concurring). The Payton court
found these arguments inapposite; in the case of warrantless home arrests,
the balance was tipped in the other direction. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 587-88 (1980). The Payton Court found that it is doubtful that warrantless entries to arrest were accepted at common law. Id. at 598. The Court
also found that there was no unanimity among the states on this point and
no indication of a congressional determination that warrantless home arrests are reasonable. Id. at 598-601.
55. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980).
56. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
57. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980). See also Donnino &
Girese, supra note 36, at 91-99 (catalogues previous Supreme Court cases
permitting search and seizure due to exigency which required that course
of action).
2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543 (1980). See Note, Search and Seizure58. 81 Ill.
Home Arrest-Where Offense Occurs One and a Half Hours Before Entry,
Police do not Deliberately Delay and Suspect is Armed, Exigent CircumstancesRender WarrantlessPolice Entry Constitutional,1981 So. ILL. U.LJ.
313.
59. In Payton, the Court denounced a New York statute, NEW YORK
CRim. PRoc. LAw § 140.15(4) (McKinney 1971) (similar to the Illinois statute,
ILL.REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 107-1-107-14 (1977)), as unconstitutional because it
authorized warrantless home arrests, by force if necessary, without exigent
circumstances. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 599 (1980).
60. 81 Ill.
2d at 167-68, 407 N.E.2d at 546-47.
61. The factors singled out as exigent circumstances in Abney were:
1) the need for prompt action; 2) the absence of any deliberate or unjustified delay by the officers during which time a warrant could have been
obtained, and 3) the belief that the suspect was armed and exhibited
some sign of a violent character. In addition, other factors were identified which suggested that the officers had acted reasonably ...[:]
1) the officers were acting on a clear showing of probable cause based
on reasonably trustworthy information, 2) the defendant was clearly
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ney court also clarified the issue of what circumstances might
be considered exigent in Illinois.
The Eichelbergercourt cited both Payton and Abney as controlling, but never discussed the facts of the case at bar in terms
of the aims or considerations embodied in those cases. Instead,
Justice Ryan stated that "[t] he case now before us is factually
different from Payton and Abney. In those cases, the crime had
been committed sometime prior to the arrest. In our case a
crime was being committed in the presence of the officers who
made the arrest in response thereto." 62 Concluding that Payton
and Abney were factually different from Eichelberger,the court
expanded the exigency exception by holding that the probable
cause derived from the observation of the offense 63 created an
exigency which justified the warrantless arrest.64 However, the
court failed to explain adequately why such observation alone
65
would be the equivalent of exigency.
Prior to the decision in Eichelberger, Illinois appellate
courts, following the authority of Payton and Abney, had come
to the conclusion that the commission of a crime in an officer's
presence did not automatically create an exigent circumstance.
In People v. Pakula,66an appellate court considered whether the
direct observation of a crime justified warrantless entry and arrest under the "plain view" exception. 67 In Pakula, the state argued that since the officers could see marijuana growing in the
identified, 3) there was strong reason to believe that the defendant was
present on the premises, and 4) the entry was peaceful.
People v. Eichelberger, 91 111. 2d 359, 367-68, 438 N.E.2d 140, 144 (1982) (paraphrasing People v. Abney, 81 III. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543 (1980)) (citations
omitted).
62. 91 m. 2d at 368, 438 N.E.2d at 144.
63. When an officer witnesses a crime in progress, probable cause requirements are necessarily met. See supra note 3.
64. People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 369, 438 N.E.2d 140, 145 (1982).
65. In support of its position, the court cited the Illinois statute conferring power upon officers to make arrests. IL.REV. STAT. ch. 38, 107-2(c)
(1979). The court also cited as support Annot., 76 A.LR.2D 1432 (1961). This
article, dealing with a police officer's power to enter a private house or enclosure to make an arrest without a warrant for a suspected misdemeanor,
predates Payton by twenty years. In light of Payton, it is doubtful whether
the cases cited in the annotation are still good law. Finally, the court cited
two Illinois cases, People v. Phillips, 30 Ill. 2d 158, 195 N.E.2d 717 (1964), and
People v. Peak, 29 Ill. 2d 343, 194 N.E.2d 322 (1963). Both of these cases also
predate Payton.

66. 89 Ml1. App. 3d 789, 411 N.E.2d 1385 (1980).
67. This exception is generally applied when an officer is effecting a
valid arrest and goes beyond his authority by seizing objects found in a suspect's residence. If such objects were in plain view or within the suspect's
control when seized, the courts will dispense with the warrant requirement.
See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (dicta). Cf.Hester v. United
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defendant's yard from their vantage point on the street, an offense was being committed in their presence, and, therefore, the
warrantless arrest was valid. 68 The court rejected this theory,
69
holding that "plain view" alone did not create exigency.
People v. Wilson 70 illustrates the same point 7' and raises the
related issue of purposeful police circumvention of the warrant
requirement. 72 In Wilson, the police covertly looked into defendant's hotel room and maintained that the observed activity provided an exigency which justified the warrantless entry.73 The
court noted that whatever exigency was present was the wholly
forseeable consequence of police behavior.74 The Wilson court
stated, "[t]o approve the consequences of such an arrest would
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (justifiable confiscation of evidence found in "open
fields").
68. People v. Pakula, 89 Ill.
App. 3d 789, 792, 411 N.E.2d 1385, 1385-88
(1980). See generally LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 589.

69. 89 Ill.
App. 3d at 794, 411 N.E.2d at 1389-90.
70. 86 Ill.
App. 3d 637, 408 N.E.2d 988 (1980).
71. The Wilson court held the arrest invalid in spite of the officers' direct observation of the crime in progress. Id. at 643, 408 N.E.2d at 992-93.
72. In 1976, Justices Marshall and Brennan discussed the issue in their
dissenting opinion in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). In
Santana, after undercover agents had set up a controlled buy, they returned to the scene of the buy without a warrant and attempted to arrest
the defendant. When the defendant realized that she was about to be arrested, she ran into her house. The majority held that, under the exigencies
presented by this situation, the warrantless entry to arrest was justified. Id.

at 43. The dissent maintained that consideration of whether "the exigency

presented in [the] case was produced solely by police conduct" and
whether this "police conduct was justifiable or was solely an attempt to circumvent the warrant requirement" was necessary. Id. at 45 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The dissenters found that "[t]he exigency that justified the
entry and arrest was solely a product of police conduct" and that they
would, therefore, have held the arrest invalid. Id. at 48 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Accord United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1979)
(holding the arrest invalid, stating that "[a Iny exigency that arose by virtue
of the presence of the rifle near the bed could have been anticipated by the
officers and does not excuse their earlier failure to obtain a warrant. ..");
United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 34 (9th Cir. 1974) (disapproving of the
police conduct, a unanimous court stated that "[kInowing that marijuana
was present and knowing that [the police] would make their presence
known to the occupants, the officers consciously established the condition
which the government now points to as an exigent circumstance...");
United States v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 371, 374 (D.D.C. 1980) ("Exigency under
the [f] ourth [a mendment must be a product of external events, not police
ingenuity."); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 803, 329 N.E.2d 717, 721
(1975) ("[W] here the exigency is reasonably foreseeable and the police offer no justifiable excuse for their prior delay in obtaining a warrant, the exigency exception to the warrant requirement is not open to them."); State v.
Canby, 252 S.E.2d 164, 166 (W. Va. 1979) ("[I] n order for police officers to
make an arrest without a warrant,... there must be exigent circumstances not of the police officers' creation.").
73. People v. Wilson, 86 Ill.
App. 3d 637, 639-40, 408 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1980).
74. Id. at 640, 408 N.E.2d at 990-91.
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render Fourth Amendment protections vulnerable to possibly
even more imaginative government-created exigencies and
quickly render the warrant requirement a nullity."75 The controlled buy set up by the officers in Eichelbergerexemplifies the
artificial exigency which the Wilson opinion warned against.
Since the Paxton officers set up the sale, any resultant "exigency" was forseeable, if not planned. The Eichelberger majority, however, never discussed the issue of possible police
circumvention of the warrant requirement presented by the
case. 76 This omission may indicate a lack of concern with an
individual's fourth amendment rights in a controlled buy context. The Eichelbergerholding seems to allow police to circumvent the warrant requirement by staging a crime and then
allowing the prosecution to claim that the commission of the
crime was an exigent circumstance which justified a warrantless
home arrest.
In

Commonwealth v. Huffman, 7 7 the Massachusetts

Supreme Court considered a situation similar to that in Eichelberger, yet came to the opposite conclusion. In Huffman, police,
by looking through defendant's apartment window, witnessed
him bagging a green herb believed to be marijuana.7 8 The police
went directly to defendant's door, found it partially open, entered, and made the arrest. 79 The court held there was no exigency even though there was probable cause to believe that the
offense was still in progress.80 The court maintained that the essence of exigency is the existence of circumstances which would
render an attempt to obtain a warrant impraticable and found
75. Id. at 643, 408 N.E.2d at 992.
76. The issue was not raised or addressed by the state's or the defendant's briefs in the lower courts. However, defendant's petition for certiorari,
denied by the United States Supreme Court, focused its argument on this
theory. Eichelberger's petition framed the issue as follows: whether the
"Fourth Amendment allows the police to enter a private dwelling without a
warrant if the police witness an illegal transaction, occurring inside, which
they arranged and control, which does not threaten life, limb, property or

the peace of the community and where there are no exigent circumstances." Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 6, People v. Eichelberger, 91 IMl.
2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140 (1982) (emphasis added).
77. 385 Mass. 122, 430 N.E.2d 1190 (1982).
78. Id. at 123, 430 N.E.2d at 1191.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 124, 430 N.E.2d at 1192. See also State v. Dias, 609 P.2d 637
(Hawaii 1980). In Dias, police were notified by an informer of the defendant's alleged illegal activity. They arrived at the scene and observed the
defendant gambling illegally. Id. at 639. The Supreme Court of Hawaii held
that the observation of the crime in progress did not create sufficient exigency to justify the warrantless home arrest. Id. at 641.

19831

People v. Eichelberger

no such circumstances under the facts presented. 8 1 The court
pointed out that the police could have left a guard on the premises while they obtained a warrant.82 There were two officers on
the scene when Eichelberger was arrested. The Eichelberger
court, unlike the Huffman court, did not suggest that one of the
officers might have obtained a warrant after the observation of
the crime while the other officer was left to stand guard.83 By
failing to examine this alternative to the warrantless arrest
which actually took place, the Eichelberger court was able to
conclude that the course taken by the officers was imperative
under the circumstances.
Post-Payton Illinois cases which have dealt with the issue of
warrantless home arrest have stated that probable cause alone
will not justify the police action; exigent circumstances must
also be present. 84 Yet the Eichelbergermajority found that probable cause-the officers' observation of the crime in progresscreated an exigency. 85 This interpretation narrowly construes
the fourth amendment protections which have been guaranteed
by the Constitution and rigorously upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.
Courts in Illinois,86 as well as in other jurisdictions, 87 cogni81. Commonwealth v. Huffman, 385 Mass. 122, 124, 430 N.E.2d 1190, 119293 (1982). Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (warrantless search
legal where there is compelling need).
82. Commonwealth v. Huffman, 385 Mass. 122, 126, 430 N.E.2d 1190, 119293 (1982). The majority of cases invalidating warrantless home arrests for
lack of sufficient exigency note that the police could have dealt adequately
with the situation by leaving a police guard on the scene while a warrant
was obtained. This would protect against the threat of flight by the suspects
or destruction of evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52
(1951).
83. The court did note that "the events occurred on a Sunday morning,
in a small city, which made it highly unlikely that a warrant could be readily
procured." People v. Eichelberger, 91 IMI. 2d 359, 370, 438 N.E.2d 140, 145
(1982). This treatment seems cursory in view of the substantial rights
involved.
84. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 104 Ill. App. 3d 833, 842, 433 N.E.2d 343, 350
(1982); People v. Henderson, 96 Ill. App. 3d 232, 235, 421 N.E.2d 219, 222
(1981); People v. Thompson, 93 IMI. App. 3d 995, 1003, 418 N.E.2d 112, 119
(1981); People v. Robinson, 91 Ill. App. 3d 1138, 1143, 415 N.E.2d 585, 589
(1980); People v. Wormack, 91 Ill. App. 3d 169, 171, 414 N.E.2d 177, 179 (1980);
People v. Haynes, 89 Ill. App. 3d 231, 236, 411 N.E.2d 876, 881 (1980).
85. 91 Ill. 2d at 369, 438 N.E.2d at 145.
86. See, e.g., People v. Patrick, 9311. App. 3d 830, 417 N.E.2d 1056 (1981);
People v. Wormack, 91 Ill. App. 3d 169, 414 N.E.2d 177 (1980); People v.
Pakula, 89 111. App. 3d 789, 411 N.E.2d 1385 (1980); People v. Rembert, 89 Ill.
App. 3d 371, 411 N.E.2d 996 (1980); People v. Boehm, 89 ill. App. 3d 176, 411
N.E.2d 1192 (1980); People v. Wilson, 8611. App. 3d 637, 408 N.E.2d 988 (1980).
87. See, e.g., State v. Dias, 609 P.2d 637 (Hawaii 1980); Commonwealth v.
Huffman, 385 Mass. 122, 430 N.E.2d 1190 (1982); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367
Mass. 798, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975); State v. Canby, 252 S.E.2d 164 (W.Va. 1979).
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zant of the grave constitutional issues presented, have cautiously invalidated warrantless home arrests similar to those in
8 8
Eichelberger.
Those courts have not allowed police to take
matters into their own hands when another course of action
could have adequately protected legitimate state interests.8 9
They have suggested that, in order to dispel the fear that evidence might be destroyed or that the suspect might flee, a police
guard be set up while another officer obtains a warrant. 90
The Eichelberger court might have pursued this course and
thereby conformed with other post-Payton cases. In Payton,
the Supreme Court spoke out against state encroachment on individual fourth amendment rights. The Eichelberger decision ignores this pro-individual emphasis. Although it seems logical
that officers would be authorized to arrest after observation of
the commission of a crime, under the Eichelberger facts, such a
holding presents dangerous ramifications. By allowing possible
police circumvention of the warrant requirement and expansion
of the parameters of the exigency requirement, the Eichelberger
decision seriously undermines the practical effect of Payton.91
Leslie B. Wulfsohn

88. See supra note 72 and note 80 and accompanying text.
89. In cases concerning constitutional rights, the Court has often forbidden a means of obtaining a societal goal because there exists an alternative,
less intrusive means to the same end. See cases discussed in Wormuth &
Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254
(1964).
90. See, e.g., People v. Vogel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 910, 914-15, 374 N.E.2d 1152,
1156 (1978); Commonwealth v. Huffman, 385 Mass. 122, 125, 430 N.E.2d 1190,
1193 (1982).
91. This note does not reflect, however, any opinion on the desirability
of upholding Eichelberger's arrest under a possible "good faith" exception
to the exclusionary rule. For discussion of this exception, see Leonard, The
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A Reasonable Approach
for Criminal Justice, 4 WHrrrIER L. REV. 33 (1982); Note, Is It Time for a
Change in the Exclusionary Rule? United States v. Williams and the Good
Faith Exception, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 161 (1982).

